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Abstract 
We investigated how bank consolidations, and sudden involuntary capital variations organically influenced small 
risk asset creation abilities of Nigerian banking firms based on the framework of Monti-Klein Theory for making 
effective lending policies. Within the past decade, banks in Nigeria have in many occasions been mandated to 
change their capital base within a limited time too short for such exercise. As a survival strategy, they resort to 
involuntary consolidations. We fear that this sudden mergers and involuntary alteration in equity level could 
blow banks to focus abnormally away from small risk asset creation thereby resulting in small business loans’ 
disequilibrium. The information regarding this likely effect has remained substantially asymmetrical constituting 
a real gap. In near future, if the gap remains, policy capable of pulling down the entire economy could emerge. 
While previous papers had attempted to solve this problem, data limitations must have made them derail from 
the target especially by engaging insufficient bank data, which can only capture the pre-merger implication. In 
this present paper, we surmounted this bottleneck by using up to 6 years post merger data. Unique to this paper, 
we selected 24 banks that involuntarily emerged and/or recapitalized after N25billion bank recapitalization- 
mandate for study using an Ex-Post Facto as a research design. Using data from Central Bank of Nigeria Bulletin 
and databases of banks we sampled for study, we found that bank consolidations under duress negatively and 
significantly influenced fully restructured banks’ propensity to create small risk assets. Moreover, we found that 
when change in equity was sudden, unplanned and involuntary, the effect on fully restructured banks propensity 
to make small loans was organically negative. Specifically, banks whose equity condition positively alters 
overnight due to involuntary consolidations break a significant proportion of their lending relationship with 
small business borrowers in the long-run. This means that involuntary consolidations and sudden equity change 
limit significantly the consolidated banks’ ability to create small risk assets. Based on these results, we 
recommendation that regulatory authority should not seek to increase lending to small businesses by encouraging 
sudden and involuntary bank capital adequacy through bank consolidations. 
Keywords: Mergers, Acquisitions, Consolidation, Small Businesses, Equity Condition, and consolidation duress 
1. Introduction 
Our focus in this study is on examining how banking firms’ consolidations under duress and the consequential 
involuntary huge capital base growth contemporaneously influence their ability to create small risk assets. Small 
risk assets in this context are loans issued by commercial banks to small business borrowers. This class of loans 
is usually prone to high default rate due to informational opaque nature of the borrowers. However, because of 
the small size inherent of the loans, small banks always transact on them due to the limitation imposed on them 
by their positions. Generally, size of firms particularly in terms of equity level has always determined the 
proportion of assets to be allocated to banks’ customers. Our interest is to ascertain the relationship between the 
small risk asset allocation dispositions of emerging merged banks and Nigeria subsequent involuntary 
consolidation experiences. Already, anecdotal evidence from BGL (2010) seems to suggest that such a sudden 
and involuntary change in financial positions as it affects capital base and gross asset sizes could make banks 
abandon their lending relationship with small businesses for higher transaction customers. This suggests to us 
that huge banks coming out of involuntary mergers and acquisitions may have less preference for small 
relationship lending deals. An alternative postulation such as Joe and Eric (1997) anyway contradict the above 
that huge banks are associated with small business loan making. They predicts that mergers and acquisitions tend 
to offer opportunity for small businesses to profit from because larger banks with greater capital and a more 
diversified loan portfolio have a greater capacity to lend to risky borrowers and withstand the risks than smaller 
banks do. While this debate subsists, we desire to contribute to the ongoing debate by taking evidence from 
Nigerian consolidation experience. From all ramifications, Nigerian environment is a typical prototype of the 
scenario of involuntary consolidations that deserves researchers’ attention. 
Normally, equity or capital adequacy ratio grows with time and as such may be gradually driving firms’ lending 
decisions. The velocity of the drive may change if the change in capital adequacy becomes dramatic. Notably, 
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over the years, starting from 1986 Basel capital Accord, capital controls and recapitalizations have been the 
remarkable feature of Nigeria banking sector. However, such phenomena have not been so dramatic such that 
minimum capital requirement suddenly increases by 1150%. In 1990, CBN issued a circular on capital adequacy 
that mandated banks to increase their minimum capital bases from N10million to N20million. However, the 
change was only 100% and expectedly did not attract attention. In 1991, CBN also demanded equity change by 
only 150% as floor capital bases only rose from N20 to N50million. Subsequently, the capital base rose from 
N500million to N1billion, then from N1 billion to N2 billion and to N25 billion. Therefore, the percentage 
change has not been as dramatic as the last change resulting in over 1150%. The last change is also unusual in 
the sense that in most of the previous recapitalization mandates, banks did not meet the mandate through 
consolidations. We fear that as the last change in equity has been huge and sudden and has been met through 
consolidations, the implication on bank lending decision could be abnormally reverberating on low credit users. 
Overnight growth in equity could generate excess liquidity that could make the group lose focus on small profit 
lending products. False confidence on sudden high positive change in capital adequacy ratio could emerge 
propelling huge investments likely to draw attention aware from low profit ventures. The key issue arising is that 
the evolving and forward-looking merged banks may have poor preference for small risk asset creation. Being a 
kind of information asymmetry, and given that the banking sector in Nigeria had experienced extra-ordinary 
levels of consolidations with resultant sudden equity alteration, we try to understand correctly the direction on 
banks’ propensity to create small risk assets. Poor understanding of the direction of the effects on bank lending 
decisions and consequently on borrowers can lead to counterproductive policies capable of ruining permanently 
the fragile economy. According to Ove and Arksel (2011), the seminar paper by Bernake (1983), claimed that 
the Great Depression of 1930s in US had a depth of its root in the destruction of corporate relationship with their 
idiosyncratic customers because of information asymmetries. In near future, if the asymmetric dynamic 
information relating to the consolidation and sudden equity change persist, Nigerian economy for instance may 
be plunged into greater depression. Therefore, how consolidations and sudden capital changes affect banking 
firms’ lending decisions cannot be ignored if not for anything for lending policy effectiveness. At least in this 
way, the current role of small businesses as the bedrock of the economy could be boosted. 
 
Although researchers, for instance Okafor and Emeni (2008) and Asuquo (2012), have previously attempted to 
investigate the reality of the effect of consolidations on bank lending to small business borrowers in Nigeria, data 
limitation may have forced them to investigate only their static effect, without considering how the phenomenon 
dynamically affect decision to create small risk assets in the long-run. Static effect according to Berger et al 
(1998), examines the effects of consolidation based on mere combination of pro forma statement of financial 
positions within one year of consolidation. This is just a short run effect likely to be too short for an informed 
decision. On the other hand, dynamic effect according to Berger et al (1998) identifies the change in lending that 
follows from decisions to restructure the institution in terms of its sizes, equity conditions, local competitive 
positions such as market share or concentration and portfolio conditions such as default risks and loan loss 
provisions after the consummation of mergers and acquisitions. According to them including Prompitak (2009), 
the dynamic effects surface at least three years after consolidations since as Focarelli et al (2003) suggest that 
there is always a delay in efficiency adjustment. This gestation period is also consistent with the results of the 
interview conducted by the Federal Reserve Board of staff with officials of banks involved in US mergers Berger 
et al (1998). This by-pass of dynamic effect constitutes a gap in literature particularly in Nigeria. On a wider 
perspective, there is also a literature gap due largely to the way theoretical foundation on banks’ behavior was 
laid. Many theories for instance, Monti-Klein Banking Firm Theory and Salop Location Model have been 
employed to explain how banks behave when structures change. However, they were all fundamentally based on 
general bank lending behavior and were not narrowed down to specifics such as lending to small businesses by 
fully restructured banks and how lending decision change when the change in equity is associated with sudden. 
The Monti-Klein theory assumed that borrowers are viewed as a homogeneous group by  the  banks. This 
however may not always apply as banks can also view borrowers as heterogeneous groups having different 
quantities of credit needs. The present study is indeed an attempt to adjust this model by narrowing Monti –Klein 
Theory down to small business lending. Specifically, we would determine the direction and the extent of the 
dynamic influence of bank mergers and acquisitions on fully consolidated banks’ ability to lend to Nigerian 
small credit users. We would also ascertain the extent sudden changes in equity condition of fully restructured 
banks as caused by consolidations dynamically influence their decision to lend to small business borrowers. 
Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, no study in Nigeria has linked dynamic consolidation with 
consequential bank financial characteristic in terms of sudden equity alterations to small risk-asset creation 
behavior of the affected merged banks and how Monti-Klein model could be applied to test its implication 
particularly on small risk asset creation. 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.13, 2015 
www.iiste.org 
195 
 
 
 
The next phases of this paper are to, first, review the related literatures; second, explain our research 
methodology; and finally, present, interpret and discuss data and result. 
 
2. Review of the Related Literature 
 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks 
Consolidation is a consummation of two or more firms of virtually the same size into a single firm. A merger 
according to Oye (2011) is a situation where two or more companies combine to form a larger business 
organization. On the other hand, according to the scholar, an acquisition involves the purchase of controlling 
shares in another company. Control is an essential element in acquisitions. That explains why Nwude (2005) 
defines acquisition as the purchase of controlling interest in one company by another company such that the 
acquired company becomes a subsidiary or a division of the acquirer. Where acquisitions occur between entities 
according to David, Britton and Ann (2009), the acquiring entity obtains control over the action of the entity 
taken over. This control, according to them, gives the acquirer the power to govern the financial and operating 
policies of the acquired, which enables them to obtain benefits from its activities. 
Literature maintains that either structure can result in the economic and financial consolidation of two entities. 
In practice according to literatures, a deal that is an acquisition for legal purposes may be euphemistically called 
a merger of equal. This is true if both according to extant literatures, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) agree that 
merging or combining would do both firm good. However, when the deal is unfriendly, that is when the target 
company does not want to be bought over and considers the acquirers as threats or black knights; it is usually 
regarded as acquisitions or takeover. An acquisition or takeover therefore is the purchase of one business or 
company by another company or other business entity, which may not even be in the best interest of the acquired 
entity. In this scenario, the purchaser would be willing to pay a price otherwise called purchase consideration for 
controlling interest or shares of at least 51%. Otherwise, the purchase is to be regarded as a mere significant 
influence, ordinary investment or joint venture in which case control is not obtained. In some cases, 100% 
controlling interest can be obtained making the target entity become a fully owned subsidiary without any 
minority or non-controlling interest in existence. Minority interest or non-controlling interest is the aspect of the 
target company’s shares that do not belong to the acquiring company. This interest always ranges between 1% 
and 49%. Consolidation occurs when two or more companies combine to form a new enterprise altogether, and 
neither of the previous companies remain independently. Acquisitions according to scholars are divided into two: 
private and public acquisitions. This depends on whether the acquirer or merging company (also termed target) is 
or is not listed on a public stock market. An additional dimension or categorization consists of whether an 
acquisition is friendly or hostile. An acquisition usually refers to a purchase of a smaller firm by a larger one. 
Sometimes, however, a similar firm according to Rumyantseva, Grzegorz and Ellen (2002), will acquire 
management control of a larger and/or longer-established company and retain the name of the latter for the post- 
acquisition combined entity. This is known as a reverse takeover. Another type of acquisition is the reverse 
merger, a form of transaction that enables private company to be publicly listed in a relatively short period. A 
reverse merger occurs when a privately held company often one that has strong prospects and is eager to raise 
financing buys a publicly listed shell company, usually one with no business and limited assets. 
From the extant literatures, achieving acquisition success has proven to be tough. Various studies have revealed 
that 50% of acquisitions were unsuccessful especially in its post-consolidation existence. The acquisition process 
is very complex, with many dimensions influencing its outcome. According to Douma and Shreuder (2013), 
serial acquirers appear to be more successful with M&A than companies who only make an acquisition 
occasionally. The new forms of buyout created since the crises are based on serial type acquisitions, which is a 
co-community ownership buy out and the new generation buy outs of the MIBO (Management Involved or 
Management Institution Buy Out) and MEIBO (Management & Employee Involved Buy Out). It is normal for 
M&A deal communications to take place in a so-called confidentiality bubble wherein the flow of information is 
restricted pursuant to confidentiality agreements. In the case of a friendly transaction, the companies cooperate in 
negotiations; in the case of a hostile deal, the board and /or management of the target is unwilling to be bought or 
the target’s board has no prior knowledge of the offer. Hostile acquisitions can and often do ultimately become 
friendly as the acquirer secures endorsement of the transaction from the board of the acquire company. This 
usually requires an improvement in terms of the offerand/or through negotiation. According to Douma and 
Schreuder (2013) in wikipedia, the combined evidence suggests that the shareholders of Acquired firms realize 
significant abnormal returns while shareholders of the acquiring company are most likely to experience a 
negative wealth effect. The overall net effect of M&A transactions appears to be positive; almost all studies 
report positive returns for the investors in the combined buyer and target firms. This implies that M&A creates 
economic value, presumably by transferring assets to management teams that operate them more efficiently. 
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Scholars also indicate that there are a variety of structures used in securing control over the assets of a company, 
which have different tax and regulatory implications. First, the buyer buys the shares, and therefore control of 
the target company acquired or purchased. Ownership control of the company in turn conveys effective control 
over the assets of the company, but since the company is acquired intact as a going concern this form of 
transaction according to scholars carries with it all of the liabilities accrued by the business over its past and all 
of the risks that company faces in its commercial environment. Second, the buyer buys the assets of the target 
company. The cash the target receives from the sell-off is paid back to its shareholders by dividend or through 
liquidation. This type of transaction leaves the target company as an empty shell if the buyer buys out the entire 
assets. A buyer often structures the transaction as an asset purchase to cherry-pick the assets that it wants and 
leave out the assets and liabilities that it does not. This can be particularly important where foreseeable liabilities 
may include future unquantifiable damage awards such as those that could arise from litigation over defective 
products, employee benefits or terminations, or environmental damage. 
 
Drivers and Motives of Mergers and Acquisition 
There are specific factors that drive bank mergers and acquisitions. These factors motivate and encourage banks 
to get involved in the activities. First among these factors is the desire for value maximization by the 
consolidating institutions. This is the shareholders’ theory of banking consolidation. Banks get involved in 
mergers and acquisitions because they want to maximize the value of their investors. They pursue this goal by 
investing to increase market power, which can easily be achieved through consolidations. In the process of 
merging, the shareholders always make sure that the mergers would result in a positive present value. Through 
bank consolidation, the involved can also achieve wealth maximization by replacing inefficient management 
after the acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions promote economies of scale and scope, which also advance the 
interest of investors. As institutions merge, their scale of operations widens for instance geographically. Increase 
in Scale of operation such as productions reduces fixed cost, which in turn bring about increasing returns  to 
scale. In order to benefit from the increasing returns associated with larger scale of operations, shareholders 
always take advantage mergers and acquisitions to meet their target value. Therefore, an economy of scale is an 
opportunity for the consolidating institutions to spread fixed costs across a larger volume of output. This 
opportunity can be achieved through the elimination of duplicating and competing resources, bulk purchases of 
materials at reduced prices due to discounts. It may be obtained through improved negotiating strength in dealing 
with suppliers, intensive utilization of production facilities, standardization of materials and products to enable 
value analysis to be applied, and acquisition of improved technology and know- how from the  acquired 
company. Moreover, banking consolidation also decreases risk through geographic and product diversification. 
This no doubt increases shareholders values thereby motivating them to consolidate. Apart from value 
maximization theory, mergers can also occur between institutions for non-value maximization purposes. Mergers 
can take place because of desire for managerial acquisitions and hubris hypothesis. When an organization needs 
expertise in management, they can come by it by acquisition of other entities, which would encourage inter- 
managerial breed. If the subsidiary has specialist knowledge in specific areas of the parent company’s production 
area, they can demand the release of the specialist from the subsidiary company for the task in the acquiring 
company since they are both under one entity. This need for managerial expertise, therefore, can drive 
institutional integrations such as mergers and acquisitions. Organizations such as banks can go for acquisitions 
because of desire to claim mere superiority over their competitors such that even when the acquisitions may not 
result in positive net present value to the parent shareholders’ wealth, the acquirers may go on to purchase the 
firm. This is the pride theory in mergers and acquisitions- in this hubris hypothesis, the predatory company just 
want to show off by even paying higher it should have cost it to acquire similar company under normal 
circumstances. In addition to these firm level motives, banks decision for mergers and acquisition might be 
influenced by external factor such as industry level differences in the economic environment, laws and 
regulations (Berger et al 1999). Taking for instance, the laws and regulations, institutions can engage in 
consolidation because a new law that positively reviewed the minimum capital base was passed. The case of the 
Nigerian consolidation experience was as a result of N25 billion minimum capital mandate by the Central Bank 
of Nigeria. This law influenced greatly the banks desire to merge in Nigeria. In 2005, 74 banks out of 89  banks 
in existence merged into 24. Indeed, the causes of mergers and acquisitions have long been debated in the 
literature (Folios et al 2011). However, following the neoclassical theory argument, all firm decisions including 
acquisitions are made with the sole objective of maximizing shareholders wealth. Mergers and acquisitions 
according to them in this context serve as a means to increase market power, replaces inefficient management, 
achieve economies of scale and scope among others. Nwude (2003) also states that the reasons behind corporate 
acquisitions and mergers are operating economies of scale; sources of supplies, finance/leverage, management 
expertise, increased market share, desire for growth and technological drive are largely the factors that firms 
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seek to achieve while pursuing policies for merger and acquisitions. The reasons for mergers and acquisitions 
would be appreciated when one considers the fact that the acquiring company may be seeking to safeguard the 
source of supply for materials so that it will not be thrown out of business suddenly. Leverage as the scholar 
noted improves earning per share, over all liquidity, access to capital markets, access to cash resources, 
acquisition of asset backing which may assist in obtaining loans. These benefits can be enjoyed through business 
combinations. Banks going for combinations may have such benefits at the back of their minds. Liquidity is an 
essential bank specific characteristic and no bank can be managed efficiently without adequate liquid assets. 
Companies fishing for management expertise can also achieve such by opting for acquisition. The motive here is 
to acquire management team that is highly experienced, aggressive, competent and respected, cross pollination 
of managerial tactics and expertise or displacement of existing management to ensure continued growth 
(Nwude:2003). 
 Imperfectly Competitive Banking Firms’ Model: Theory of Deposit, Loan, Costs, and Rates 
There are varieties of theories postulated all in an attempt to explain how banks behave. Examples of such 
theories are The Marginal Cost Pricing (MCP) theory based on perfectly competitive market, Salop Location 
Theory of Salop (1979), based on transportation cost and Monti-Klein Theory of Banking Firms based on 
imperfect competitive market structures (Prompitak, 2009). Our review would centre on the imperfectly 
competitive banking firms’ market structures, which is the one Monti-Klein Theory of banking firm is based on 
as banking market now is characterized as an imperfectly competitive, in which case each national market is led 
by few large banks. The father of this theory was Edgeworth (1888) and he identified the unique features of 
banks holding less than 100% of deposits as reserve. In this way, banks according to the theory make profits 
from the positive margin obtained from the difference between risk asset (loan) and deposit interest rates. Klein 
(1971) and Monti (1972) formalized this theory in relation to bank monopoly, and is popularly known as Monti- 
Klein model of the banking firm. The unique thing about this theory is that it views banking firms operating in a 
static setting, where a monopolistic bank is assumed a financial intermediary, which collects savings from 
households deposits and finances investment needs to firms by lending to them. The decision variables are the 
amount of loans, the amount of deposits and costs of issuing loans and maintaining deposits. Good combination 
of these assets and liabilities enables banks to drive optimal profit level. Therefore, the optimizing profit function 
of banks based on the traditional Monti-Klein model can be expressed as the following equation: 
=rL ( L) L +rS -rD ( D) D -C ( L, D)……………………………..1 
Subject to S+L = D.  is the monopolist bank’s profit, which is assumed to be concave. It indicates that it is 
diminishing returns to scale. r , rL and rD are the returns on security, loan and deposit, respectively. The inverse 
demand function for loans is given by; rL ( L) , with derivative rL′( L)<0. The inverse supply function of 
deposits is rD ( D) , with derivative rD′( D)>0. S, L, and D are the amounts of security, loan and deposit, 
respectively. C is the total intermediate costs of managing an amount L of loans and an amount D of deposits. 
This is the convex managing-cost function. To maximize the profit, the proportion of total funds allocated to the 
loan is chosen at the point where the marginal return on loan is equal to the average expected return on 
investment or equity or government security. The optimal loan-pricing rule presents the equalities between the 
Lerner’s indices (price-cost/price), and inverse elasticity. That is, in the Monti-Klein model, a monopolist bank 
would set its loan and deposit volumes such that the Lerner’s indices equal inverse elasticity (Klein, 1971). 
 Market Concentration 
Traditional Monti-Klein theory has been expanded to accommodate bank competition variable. The assumption 
that bank operates without a rival is one of its shortcomings. Evidence of this expansion can be seen in the 
oligopoly models postulated by Freixas and Rochet, (1998). In this version, according to Freixas and Rochet 
(1998), the Monti-Klein model can be reinterpreted as a theory or model of imperfect (Cournot) competition 
between a finite number N of banks, n ranges from 1,.. to N. By having the same assumptions as  the 
monopolistic model has, with the additional assumption that every bank has the same linear cost function (which 
is the function of aggregate loan volume, L, and aggregate amount of deposit, D), the optimal condition for every 
bank holds just as in the traditional version. The only difference is that the elasticity always written as €Lis 
multiplied by the total number of banks, N. Because the number of banks reflects the intensity of competition in 
the market, we can decipher the relationship between competition and the loan interest rate or loans. That is, as 
the number of banks in the market increases, or when the market is more competitive, a bank tends to reduce its 
loan price and propensity to lend. 
 Liquidity Risks 
In the refined Monti-Klein model, it is assumed that bank can suffer from liquidity risk, which occurs when the 
bank has to make unexpected cash payments or when there is an unexpected massive withdrawal of deposits. 
This risk is defined in the model by the random amount in the volume of deposit withdrawals. If the deposit 
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withdrawals are larger than the bank reserve, a liquidity shortage results and the bank has to pay some penalty 
cost for this shortage. Denoting R to be the reserve requirement, the question now is how large should the 
reserve, R, be in lending to borrowers in order to maximize profit? To determine this, it is being assumed by the 
authors that net withdrawal is a random variable X. If the realization is greater than R, the bank must pay a 
penalty rp. The banks profit is thus: 
(R)= rL (D-R) + rPE[max (0, X-R)] ----------------------------------------------- 2 
The first order condition of the equation correlates with the traditional Monti-Klein model giving r
*
L = 
r+rP,P{XR}/1-1/EL; and r
*
D= r+rP,P{XR}/1-1/ED. One can then show that the followings hold from the 
theory: If rP increases, then r
*
L and r
*
D also increases and L decreases while D increases and that if the variance 
of X increases, then R>0, L decreases. This theory therefore assets that increase in liquidity risk, R leads to 
decrease in loan L. 
 Default Risk 
According to Freixas and Rochet (1998), Monti-Klein model has been extended to the case of risky loans.  That 
is to the case of default risk where loans may become irrecoverable in the case of complete default. The problem 
is adapted from Dermine (1986), where borrowers are permitted to default. In this extension, it is supposed the 
bank has lent quantity of loan L to a firm or borrower that has invested it in a risky asset with a net unit return Y. 
The net return to the bank will be min (rL, Y). When Y< rL, and there was no collateral, the firm or borrower 
defaults, and the bank seizes the firm’s asset that is worth (I+Y)L. Just as the Monti-Klein model shows, the 
bank would always default if Y falls below some threshold Y*. Since risk is assumed to be neutral and the bank 
limited liability company, the bank chooses the volumes of L* of loans and D* of deposits that maximizes its 
profit. Should this profit become negative, the bank would default. The first order condition would be 
characterized by L* and D* condition as in the Monti-Klein model and on the contrary L* depends in general on 
what happens on the deposits side so that the separation property is lost. The profit of the banks becomes; 
(L, D, Y)=[ min(rL(L), Y)-r]+r-rD(D)]D ---------------------------------------- 3 
In conclusion, comparative statistic shows that spread increases with default risk that is high leverage result in 
high spread, spread (S) increases with risk (δ ) that is High risk high spread, and the global risk premium sT 
increases with T. 
 Bank Capital 
Equity position of banks is very significant in determining how banks behave in terms of maximizing  their 
profit. Going from the traditional theory of capital by Klein (1971), the bank is assumed to have a preference 
ordering over the average rate of return on equity, which can be represented by a utility function that is linear. 
Based on this, the decision of the firm is always to optimize expected utility or, equivalently according to the 
scholar, the rate of return on equity. In this framework, bank has two basic sources of funds. First, the capital 
invested in the bank by the owners and second, funds that were obtained by the issuance of various types of 
deposits. Undercapitalization of banks then has effects on bank lending behavior. 
 Empirical Review 
Lance and Franco (2005) maintained that the general conclusion of several empirical studies is that mergers 
between large banks reduce the combined banks’ level of small business lending while mergers between small 
banks tend to increase the combined level of small-business lending. Hans and Nancy (2005) found that mergers 
generate short-term and long-term effects on borrowers’ probability of losing a lending relationship on credit 
availability. According to them, mergers have heterogeneous impacts across borrowers’ types including 
borrowers of acquiring and target banks, borrowers of differing size, borrowers with single versus multiple 
relationships and borrowers with differing relationship intensities. Peek and Eric (1997), found that the acquirer 
has a lager portfolio share of small business loans than its target. According to their finding, acquirers tend to 
recast the target in their own image, causing small business loan-portfolio share of the consolidated bank to 
converge toward the pre-merger portfolio shares of the acquirers. Berger et al (1998) found that the static effects 
of banking consolidation reduced small business lending. These reductions, according to them, are mostly offset 
by the dynamic reaction of other banks in the market. For Nicolas (1996), strong evidence suggests that there are 
several reasons that can lead to discounting the popular notion that consolidation in the banking sector leads to a 
constricted flow of credit to small businesses. As regards bank financial characteristics, Okafor and Emeni 
(2008), found that such a change due to consolidation had negative effects on bank lending to small businesses in 
Nigeria consistent with the findings of Asuquo (2012). Scholars had found that overall market concentration 
position influences loan interest rates, although it appears it has little or no significant effect on  credit 
availability. Sapienza (2002), found that increase in market concentration increases the loan interest rate by 59 
basis points consistent with Agelini, et al (1998) who found non-significant effects of local credit market 
concentration on the likelihood of firms being credit rationed. Market concentration is found to have a positive 
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and significant impact on level of personal loans (Kahn, Pennacchi and Sopranzetti 2000). 
In the context of bank pricing/lending behavior, the Monti-Klein model has been applied to a number of studies. 
Therefore, Monti-Klein model remains a suitable model for examining the impacts of bank mergers and 
acquisitions and can be applied for sudden equity changes on credit creation. Unfortunately, in the context of 
Nigerian banking sector, this good framework has not been applied to analyze how consolidation and equity 
alteration can affect bank lending to small businesses. The theory therefore forms our theoretical framework. 
3 Methodology 
 Research Design 
The research engaged Ex-Post Factor research design by carrying out a ten-year (2001 to 2010) cross-sectional 
trend study of the Nigerian banking industry. The periods under study were divided into two, which were periods 
from 2001 to 2004 and the period from 2005 to 2010. The period 2001 to 2004 covers four-year pre-merger time 
while the period 2005-2010 covers a six –year post- merger era. To separate the impact of pre merger from post- 
merger, and in order to capture the time effect or the trend effect on bank lending, we created a dummy variable 
mer, which takes the value 0 for pre-merger period and 1 for post merger period. 24 commercial banks that 
emerged successfully through the N25billion minimum recapitalization exercises that took place between 
2005/2006 were selected for study. Hence, they form both the population and sample for this study. Data were 
obtained from the Central Bank of Nigerian Statistical Bulletins and were analyzed using multiple regression 
analysis technique with the aid of E- View. 
Econometric model 
As we earlier maintained, the effects of bank mergers and acquisitions on bank lending can be dynamic. Based 
on this, we model for restructuring dynamic effects. The model adopted for the study is the Monti-Klein Banking 
firm model, which we briefly described in details above. The model is based on an imperfectly competitive 
market structure, which means that banks can exert some power of monopoly. The decisions variables are loans, 
deposits, liquidity risk, default risk, costs, security or assets and equity. The problem faced by banks is how to 
combine loans to maximize profit. The following equation is expected to hold as banks try to maximize profit. 
=rL ( L) L -rD ( D) D – rIF-C ( L, D)-rpE{max(0, X-R)}-µrL(L)L………………… ........... 4 
The above model is subject to reserve requirement condition, R=αD and limitation imposed by the statement of 
financial position- R+L=IF+D. r , rL and rD are the returns on security, loan and deposit, respectively. The 
inverse demand function for loans is given by; rL ( L) , with derivative rL′( L)<0. The inverse supply function of 
deposits is rD (D), with derivative rD′( D)>0. S, L, and D are the amounts of security, loan and deposit, 
respectively. C is the total intermediate costs of managing an amount L of loans and an amount D of deposits. 
This is the convex managing-cost function. To maximize the profit, the proportion of total funds allocated to the 
loan is chosen at the point where the marginal return on loan is equal to the average expected return on 
investment or equity or government security. The optimal loan-pricing rule presents the equalities between the 
Lerner’s indices (price-cost/price), and inverse elasticity. That is, in the Monti-Klein model, a monopolist bank 
would set its loan and deposit volumes such that the Lerner’s indices equal inverse elasticity (Klein, 1971). R is 
the reserve requirement and X is a random variable denoting net withdrawal. The level of the withdrawal 
indicates how the bank is guided by the liquidity risk. rp is the penalty for exceeding the withdrawal limit or for 
liquidity default. IF and µ represent interbank financing rate and the default risk likelihood-the default 
probability of a loan. Since the interest of this paper is on credit availability, L in the above equation is then to be 
made the subject. This means the problem of banks is to select loan package that would maximize their profit. 
They can do this by wise pricing. Therefore, the equation can be adjusted thus: 
L
S 
= +rD ( D) D + rIF+C ( L, D)+rpE{max(0, X-R)}+µrL(L)L…………………………5 
=r; LS denotes loans to small business borrowers. 
The model is therefore specified thus: 
Sblit= β1rit +β2equit+β3bcr
4  +β gta + β  dep + β liqrsk β npl + β Cost+δmer+m………..6 
Where 
it 4 it 5 it 6 it +    7 it 8 
Β1 is the vector coefficient of interest rates r that would maximize bank profit. Β2 is the vector coefficient on the 
independent variable -bank equity (equ). Β3 is the vector coefficient on independent variable- bank concentration 
of 4 top banks (bcr
4
) measuring market share. Β4 is the vector coefficient on independent variable- bank gross 
asset (gta). Β5 is the vector coefficient on independent variable -bank deposit (depa). Β6 is the coefficient of 
liquidity risk (liqrsk). Β7 is the coefficient of default risk (npl). Β8 is the slope of intermediation cost (cost). δ is 
the vector coefficient on merger dummy to be estimated separately with m since other non- dummy variables 
were based on fixed effect. mit is the stochastic error or the unobservable individual level effects or the constant. 
Other specified variables are explained in table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Explanation of Variables 
Variable Symbol Description Source 
Small Business 
Loans 
Sbl This stands for bank loans to small business borrowers. It is a 
measure of aggregate bank loans to small-scale businesses. These 
loans are used as proxy for small risk assets. The variable is 
transformed into natural logarithm. 
Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) 
Statistical Bulletins 
Lending Rate R This equals the average lending rate that maximizes banks’ profit. CBN Bulletin 
Concentration 
Ratio of 4 
Biggest Banks 
Cr4 This is the bank concentration ratio/ index of four biggest firms in the 
Nigerian banking industry measured in terms of total assets. 
Concentration ratio determines the market share of banks in the 
domestic banking market setting. Hence, it used in order to feature the 
bank’s market structure, or in other words, the competitive 
environment in which the banks operates (Prompitak, 2008). To 
calculate the concentration ratio, we measure the individual 
market 
shares of the selected banks. Thus we apply the formular: ∑4      Ci, C = 
i=1 i 
the concentration  ratio  of each  selected  top bank= individual  assets/ 
total industry assets, i=1,…4, N= the number of the banks =4, 
∑= summation symbol. 
CBN
 Statistica
l Calculation
 and 
Author 
Computation 
Variables Symbols Descriptions Source 
Bank Size/
 gross 
Total asset 
Gta This variable stands for bank gross assets. It measures bank size 
effects on credit policy of banks. It is transformed into natural 
logarithm to enhance normality and linearity. The essence of this 
variable stems from the evidence that mergers between two banks do 
not always give arithmetic result of 2+2 =4. At times in consolidation, 
2+2 can be 3 or 6, for instance. These asset diversifications or 
divestitures can affect bank-lending behavior differently. 
CBN 
Statistical 
Bulletin 
Equity Equ This stands for bank financial characteristic/condition. It is measured 
as the ratio of bank equity to total assets. Equity is the aggregate of 
the shareholders fund. This variable capture the effect on loans to 
small businesses because of the way the new institutions restructure 
itself that may alter its  equity condition. This change in equity over 
a period could significantly affect the banks propensity to lend. 
CBN 
Statistical 
Bulletin and 
Author 
Computatio n 
Non-performing 
loans 
Npl This is portfolio condition variable. It captures the effect of post- 
consolidation default risk on loan supply of banks. It is measured by 
the ratio of provision for non-performing loan to total loan. This 
variable is expected to have a negative effect holding all other 
variables constant, as higher non-performing loans impose the risk of 
loss. It is expected that as the bank increases provision for non- 
performing loans, their liquidity may fall. 
CBN 
Statistical 
Bulletins and 
Authors 
Deposit Demands Dep This is a variable that stands for ratio of total deposit to asset. It is an 
independent variable that measures industry market size or bank 
deposit market-demand. We transformed it in logarithm and expressed 
it in percentage to remove the variations that would result from the 
size differences. This variable captures bank deposit characteristics 
and indicates changes in bank financing. 
CBN 
Bulletins and 
Author 
Source: Author 
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Table 1; Explanation of Variables Continues 
Variables Symbols Descriptions Source 
Liquidity Risk Liqrsk measures the effect of liquidity risk on bank lending 
behavior. Liquidity risk is the ratio of bank loans to 
total deposits expressed in percentage. The fear    of 
CBN Bulletin 
and Authors 
  unexpected withdrawal can affect the manner in 
which bank can lend to borrowers. This variable is 
featured to capture the effects of changes in deposit 
in relation to lending to small businesses. 
 
Intermediating Cost Cost This is the intermediation costs. That is the cost of 
issuing loans and maintaining deposits. It is an 
omitted variable for multi-co linearity reasons. 
CBN Bulletins 
Merger Dummy mer This is a dummy merger variable. It is featured to 
capture pre-merger and post-merger effects on bank 
lending behavior. It takes the value 1 for post- 
merger periods and 0 for pre-merger period. By 
estimating this dummy, we would be able to 
compare the pre-merger and post-merger effects. 
 
Source; Author 
 
4 Results and Discussions 
The raw data we obtained for this study are presented in table 2 below. Our analysis however in respect of the 
data will be based on the regression output as we displayed in table 4. 
Table 2: The Raw Data Obtained 
Year NPLOAN BAC4 BTDEP BTA SBLOANS EQUITY BLOANS 
2010 107961.6 8361953 9784542 17331559 12550 3829448 9611990 
2009 93086.2 8828001 9150037 17522858 16366 2961363 9667877 
2008 
32436.8 
5951779 7960166 15919559 13512 2642647 
7799400 
2007 28757.7 3810984 5001470 10981693 41100 1625291 4820696 
2006 14036.6 2426729 3245156 7172932 25713 1061594 2609289 
2005 
64153.1 
1236126 2036089 4515117 50672 717903.7 
1991146 
2004 61998.7 897337 1661482 3753277 54981 412860.6 1519243 
2003 41254.3 640546 1337296 3047856 90176 536422.7 1203199 
2002 47476.2 480409 1157111 2766880 82368 500805.3 948464.1 
2001 45004.2 261303 947182 2247039 52428 364020.5 844486.2 
Source: Author Data Picked From CBN Statistical Bulletin. NB: Figures in millions of Naira. BTDEP = 
Total Bank Deposit, BTA =Total Bank Asset, SBLOAN= Total Loans to Small Businesses. BAC4= Sum of the 
Bank Assets of 4 top banks, EQUITY= total shareholders fund, NPLOANS= Non-performing loan (bad loan). 
The table presents the data as handpicked from the central bank of Nigeria statistical bulletins for a ten-year 
period. 
Likewise, the descriptive statistics are displayed in table 3 below. The descriptive statistics are computed from 
the operational measures of the variables as displayed in table 4 below. Although, other variables are important 
our area of emphasis is on equ. To avoid the problem of multi co linearity, some variable were omitted. In equ, 
we can see that the equity value is 16.4%. Considering the minimum and maximum values, which are 11.00% 
and 22.095%, it is clear that changes in small business loans must have been driven by the changes in equity 
condition of banks. The difference between the maximum and the minimum more than doubled implying the 
change was sudden and would likely blow banks’ lending orientations. The standard deviation is less than 0.1. 
This means the deviation from the real mean would not poorly affect the regression result. 
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Table 3: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 Sbl Cr4 Npl Dep Equ Gta Liqrsk 
Mean 4.5504 30.585 2.4704 1.6671 16.4000 7.7200 92.899 
Median 4.6595 30.605 2.1725 1.6553 16.40000 7.6478 93.912 
Maximum 4.955 50.38 5.3290 1.7517 22.0950 8.5416 105.65 
Minimum 4.099 11.63 0.416 1.6214 11.0000 6.8893 80.405 
Std. Dev. 0.3166 0.0127 0.0 1950 0.0422 0.0282 0.6330 0.0784 
Source: Author from E-View 
Note: sbl, cr4, npl, dep, equ, gta and liqrk were as previously defined. 
 
Table 4: OPERATION MEASURE OF THE VARIABLES FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Gta Sbl depa Equ cr4(%) Npl Liqrsk(%) 
7.238838 4.098654 
56.45506 
22.09523 48.25 
1.1232 98.23648 
7.243605 4.213956 
52.21772 
16.9 50.38 
0.9628 105.6594 
7.201931 4.130726 
50.00243 
16.6 37.39 
0.4159 97.98037 
7.040669 4.613846 
45.54371 
14.8 34.7 
0.5965 96.38558 
6.855697 4.410165 
45.24169 
14.8 33.83 
0.5379 80.40567 
6.654669 4.704773 
45.09493 
15.9 27.38 
3.2219 97.7927 
6.574411 4.740214 
44.2675 
11 23.91 
4.0809 91.43901 
6.483994 4.955093 
43.87661 
17.6 21.02 
3.4287 89.97253 
6.44199 4.915761 
41.82006 
18.1 17.36 
5.0056 81.96829 
6.351611 4.719567 
42.15245 
16.20001 11.63 
5.3292 89.15775 
Source: CBN reports of various years, CBN statistical Bulletins and Author computations. NB: cr
4 
= the 
concentration ratio of biggest banks measured in relation to total deposit, dep=Log10 of Total Bank Deposits, 
gta= log10 of total bank gross Asset, sbl = Log10 of bank loans to small business borrowers, and equ= ratio of 
bank equity to total asset. npl= ratio of non-performing (Bad) loans to total loans, liqrsk=ratio of total loan to 
total deposits. 
 Regression Coefficients 
The table below presents the regression result for this study. This regression output was determined using the 
operation measures of the variables as shown in table 4 above. 
Table 5:  Dynamic Regression Coefficients 
Dependent Variable: SBL   
Included observations: 10   
Variable Dynamic Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Gta -0.931261 0.166854 -5.581305 0.0051 
Dep 7.454653 0.796398 9.360461 0.0007 
Npl -0.103358 0.042090 -2.455621 0.0700 
Liqrsk 0.004153 0.005968 0.695827 0.5248 
cr4 -0.015214 0.006882 -2.210717 0.0916 
Equ -0.021558 0.012940 -1.665946 0.1711 
Mer -0.470583 0.139022 -3.384952 0.0096 
M 4.832750 0.107686 44.87812 0.0000 
R-squared 0.588856 Mean dependent var 4.550400 
Adjusted R-squared 0.912851 S.D. dependent var 0.316677 
S.E. of regression 0.093486 Akaike info criterion -1.618301 
Sum squared resid 0.034959 Schwarz criterion -1.436750 
Log likelihood 14.09151 Durbin-Watson stat 2.341478 
Source: Author from E-View; Data used for the Estimation from the CBN Bulletin Displayed in Appendix 
Gta= gross total asset; a control independent variable. Dep= deposit; the ratio of total deposit to total assets, npl= 
non performing loan= (Total Non-Performing Loans/Total Loan), liqrisk=liquidity risk, cr4= concentration ratio 
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of 4 largest banks in terms of assets, equ= equity=Total Shareholders Fund/ Total Gross Asset, mer=merger 
dummy variable, m=unobservable individual level effect 
Interpretation and Discussion of Result 
Based on the regression output, the R
2
, which indicates the proportion of the dependent variable behavior 
accounted for by the explanatory variables, is high. 96.1% of the bank lending is accounted for by the changes in 
the explanatory variables. The high value of the coefficient of determination shows the model fits well. The 
model can be fit thus: Sbl=7.45depa -0.0215equ-0.015bcr
4
-0.93gta+0.004npl -0.103liqrsk. 
The result shows that banking firms’ consolidations negatively influenced banks’ ability to lend  to small 
business borrowers and the effect is significant (δ= -0.47; p-value < 0.05) inconsistent with the finding of 
Hakimi and Khazri (2012) who found no effect of bank consolidations on small businesses. This implies that 
small business borrowers are not substantially benefiting from banking consolidations in the long run. This has 
adverse implication in an economy where banking consolidations are subsequent; lending to small business 
borrowers would plummet while huge borrowers may benefit. Then continual consolidations may lead to 
monopolistic competition, which could negatively affect demand for loans as the suppliers are going to take 
advantage of this by increasing the lending rate to make abnormal profit always associated with monopoly firms. 
Consistent with Monti-Klein prediction, changes in deposits had a positive relationship with credit availability. 
This implies that if consolidations decrease credits to small businesses, increase in deposit or deposit growth 
would likely counter such decrease. Moreover, such credit imbalance could be removed by the  dynamic 
reactions of other non-players, which may choose to pick those credits that are no more attractive to the evolving 
banks. Default risk, liquidity risk and bank concentration all indicate negative dynamic effect. Ultimately, these 
variables restrict banks from making significant loans to small businesses. We can see that concentration does 
not always result in bank efficiency inconsistent with the traditional Monti-Klein theory. This suggests caution in 
making of policy. The assumption of Efficient Structure Performance may not hold in relation to bank lending to 
small businesses. 
Consistent with the finding of Berger et al (1998), mergers between big banks tend to reduce credit availability 
to small credit users contrary to the postulation of Joe and Eric (1997). We found that sudden change in 
restructured banks’ capital negatively affects loans to small businesses although the effect is not significant (β= - 
0.021558, p-value > 0.05). This means that sudden changes in bank equity do not encourage fully restructured 
banks to lend to small business borrowers. This support the prediction that bank mergers will lead to fewer 
services offered to small businesses because the economies of scale and scope expected to be realized lead to the 
pursuit of larger mostly corporate customers. This authenticate the prediction that time-consuming relationship 
customers that require extra-time and effort to infer private information regarding credit quality will be 
abandoned in favor of more financially transparent public corporations that do not require such time and effort. 
This finding has significant implication for decision making in Nigeria since is not totally consistent with few of 
the domestic work in this perspective. Take for instance, the finding is not consistent with the finding of Okafor 
et al (2008), who found that bank size, bank financial characteristics (equity) of recapitalized banks positively 
related to small business lending. In our case we found net effect of recapitalized merged and non-merged banks 
negative. Based on the coefficient (β) reported above, ceteris paribus, for every 1% increase in the consolidated 
banks’ equity, fully restructured banks may decide to cut 0.022% of their asset as loans to small businesses. In 
subsequent consolidating conditions among banking firms, small business borrowers are going to suffer 
substantially. We can infer from the outcome of the analysis that exceptionally high- based capital banks may 
result in banks’ exceptional concentration, which would affect bank relation with informational opaque 
customers. Our analysis has proved that as bank equity increases, banks would likely allocate less of their 
resources to small credit borrowers. Increase in shareholders’ funds through banking consolidations therefore 
negatively affected banks’ decision to lend to small business borrowers. Promulgating laws that will bring about 
sudden equity alteration through mergers and acquisitions in Nigeria could discourage the emerging huge banks 
from lending to small business borrowers. 
 Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
The study indicated that banking consolidation had non-significant, but dynamic negative influence on Nigerian 
banks’ ability to lend to small business borrowers. Although the influence is not statistically significant, the 
economic significant of the effect cannot be ignored. Moreover, it was found that sudden changes in bank equity 
of huge recapitalized banks negatively affected banks’ decisions to allocate loans to small business borrowers 
such that for every 1% increase in shareholders fund, banks decided to decrease loans to small businesses by 
0.022%. Therefore, based on the merger dummy time effect, one can confidently announce that the overall long- 
term effects of bank mergers and acquisitions are negative on the welfare of small business borrowers. Overnight 
change  in  capital  base  should  not  be  encouraged  among  Nigerian  banks  especially  that  pursued  through 
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consolidations. However, we anticipate that if Micro-finance banks are to be sensitized on the possible small 
credit market created by bank mergers and acquisitions and the consequential sudden equity alterations, the 
equilibrium could be maintained in the end. 
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